Is China turning Latin? by Fischer, A.M. (Andrew Martín)
 
 
 
 
Working Paper 
No. 496 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Andrew Martín Fischer 
 
 
 
 
February 2010 
 
Is China Turning Latin? 
China’s balancing act between power and dependence 
on the wave of global imbalances 
 2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 0921-0210 
 
The Institute of Social Studies is Europe’s longest-established centre of higher education and 
research in development studies. On 1 July 2009, it became a University Institute of the Erasmus 
University Rotterdam (EUR). Post-graduate teaching programmes range from six-week diploma 
courses to the PhD programme. Research at ISS is fundamental in the sense of laying a scientific 
basis for the formulation of appropriate development policies. The academic work of ISS is 
disseminated in the form of books, journal articles, teaching texts, monographs and working 
papers. The Working Paper series provides a forum for work in progress which seeks to elicit 
comments and generate discussion. The series includes academic research by staff, PhD 
participants and visiting fellows, and award-winning research papers by graduate students. 
Working Papers are available in electronic format at www.iss.nl 
 
Please address comments and/or queries for information to: 
Institute of Social Studies 
P.O. Box 29776 
2502 LT The Hague 
The Netherlands  
or  
E-mail: wpapers@iss.nl 
 3
Table of Contents 
Abstract  4 
List of Figures 5 
Acronyms  5 
INTRODUCTION 6 
1 CEPAL STRUCTURALISTS ON EXTERNAL DISEQUILIBRIA 8 
2   CHINA’S ACCOUNTS AND BALANCES SINCE OPENING AND REFORM 11 
3   CONCLUSION: BETWEEN SOFT POWER AND HARD DEPENDENCE 23 
REFERENCES 25 
 
 4
Abstract 
This paper investigates whether China has escaped the vulnerabilities of 
peripheral and dependent late industrialisation in the build up to the current 
global economic crisis, with reference to structuralist critiques of Latin 
American industrialisation in the 1960s and examined through China’s balance 
of payments data. While it would seem that China’s huge surpluses amid 
sustained growth eliminate any comparative relevance to Latin America, the 
paper argues that analogous vulnerabilities exist. These were more evident 
before China’s spectacular surplus surge in the 2000s, although even in the 
midst of the surge, volatility on the capital account and in the errors of 
omissions was ominous. Changes on the trade account also reflect China’s 
relatively subordinate position within the massive rerouting of international 
production networks via China that followed the East Asian crisis, for the 
most part led by Northern transnational corporations. In sum, overly 
optimistic appraisals of China’s strength underestimate many of its persisting 
structural vulnerabilities as a contemporary developing country and distract 
attention away from important lessons for other developing countries.  
Keywords 
China; global imbalances; balance of payments; late industrialisation; 
international production networks; transnational corporations; structuralism 
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Is China Turning Latin?  
China’s balancing act between power and dependence on the 
wave of global imbalances 1 
Introduction  
Has China escaped the vulnerabilities of peripheral and dependent late 
industrialisation in the build up to the current global economic crisis? This 
question is important with regard to expectations now being placed on China 
to play a central role in mediating the crisis due to its large holdings of foreign 
reserves and its large trade surpluses with the US and Europe.2 It is also 
important with regard to the degree to which the Chinese experience of the last 
decade, during which most of its reserves were accumulated, can or should be 
held up as a replicable or sustainable model for other developing countries, or 
whether it vindicates important lessons from development experiences of the 
past, albeit on a much larger and more dramatic scale.  
In this sense, China brings us back to development debates of the 
1960s and 1970s over dependent growth in Latin America, then the most 
industrially-advanced region of the Global South. While China was still under 
the autarky of Maoism during this earlier post-war phase of emerging 
international financial disequilibria,3 Latin America was experiencing decently 
rapid rates of growth, with Brazil briefly hailed as a growth miracle. In the 
meantime, China has now arisen as the new growth miracle among large poor 
countries, charting a new path for those disillusioned (or never illusioned) with 
the remedies of the dominant international financial institutions.  
There are obviously enormous differences between China and these 
earlier experiences of peripheral late industrialisation, whether in Latin America 
or East Asia. Besides the difference in sheer scale, China began its ascent into 
rapid growth from the basis of an entirely state-owned and controlled 
economy, under which considerable industrial and technological capacity had 
already been developed, mostly on the basis of domestic resources. Much of 
this state ownership remains in the economy, whether explicitly or implicitly, 
particularly in key strategic sectors. Even today, all rural land is still owned by 
the state. Banks are still largely state-owned, albeit in an increasingly 
                                                 
1 Although not responsible for any of the views expressed herein, this paper 
benefitted enormously from many exchanges with Kari Polanyi Levitt and Mary 
Zsamboky. Much thanks is also due for the feedback on various manifestations of this 
paper over the last two years from (in alphabetical order); James Galbraith, Jayati 
Ghosh, Gong Sen, Charles Gore, Arjan de Haan, Jan Kregel, Tak-Wing Ngo, Howard 
Nicholas, James Putzel, Ken Shadlen, Max Spoor, Geoff Tily, and Zhu Ling. I am also 
grateful for the lasting influence of Athar Hussain and Tom Naylor. In particular, my 
attention was initially drawn to many of the issues discussed in this paper during the 
three years I worked for Tom in the early 1990s researching international 
underground finance.  
2 See Fischer (2009d) for a detailed discussion of these positions as expressed by 
Martin Wolf, Ben Bernanke, Paul Krugman, and even, somewhat ambiguously, by 
Robert Wade.  
3 See Kregel (2008) for a discussion of these phases of financial disequilibria.  
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decentralised manner. In this context, the terms ‘liberalisation’ and 
‘privatisation’ have carried fundamentally different implications in China than 
in Latin America, the latter with its mixed economies, transnationalised private 
sectors, and high degrees of inequality rooted in colonial legacies of private 
land tenure. However, bearing in mind these very pertinent differences, 
‘opening and reform’ in China since the late 1970s has ushered in a variety of 
notably Latin American characteristics, setting it aside from some key attributes 
of South Korea and Taiwan. These include rapidly rising inequalities to levels 
that are now within the lower range of Latin American countries, or else the 
rapid transnationalisation of ownership in its manufacturing export sector. 
Hence, despite the rave about the rise of China as a new economic 
superpower, there is merit in examining its recent experience through the lens 
of earlier structuralist critiques of post-war late industrialisation in Latin 
America by economists involved with the centre-periphery approach of the 
Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL), notably Raul Prebisch, 
Celso Furtado, and Osvaldo Sunkel. Their critiques focused on two patterns of 
disequilibrium; one internal in the form of polarisation and marginalisation in 
the domestic economy and society, and one external in the form of structural 
weaknesses in the balance of payments. Out of these two patterns, rising 
inequalities in China arguably carry stronger comparative potential to Latin 
America.4 However, this paper focuses on the less obvious issue of external 
disequilibria.  
On first reaction, it would seem that China’s huge current account 
surpluses and its enormous build-up of foreign exchange reserves effectively 
eliminate any comparative relevance to these earlier structuralist critiques. 
However, analogous vulnerabilities remain perceptible. These were more 
apparent before China’s spectacular surplus surge since 2001, although certain 
underlying patterns continued even in the midst of the surge. The surge itself 
also reflects China’s relatively subordinate integration within the massive 
rerouting of international production networks via China that followed the 
East Asian crisis, for the most part led by Northern transnational corporations.    
These findings are presented in two parts. The first reviews some of 
the main CEPAL structuralist insights on the external vulnerabilities of 
peripheral dependent industrialisation, focusing on the contributions of Celso 
Furtado and Osvaldo Sunkel in particular. The second part offers an inductive 
time-series analysis of China’s balance of payments position with the world 
from 1982 to 2008 and a regional breakdown of its trade accounts. The 
conclusion reflects on the dialectical nature of China’s strengths and 
vulnerabilities that have flowed from the relatively dependent nature of its 
rapid integration into global production and trading systems dominated by 
transnational corporations. In this light, overly optimistic evaluations of 
China’s strength do little service to China or to the important lessons that 
other countries of the Global South need to learn from China’s experience.  
                                                 
4 Domestic processes of polarisation and marginalisation are beyond the scope of the 
current article. For some discussion of polarisation in Western China, see Fischer 
(2005; 2009a; 2009c). For an introduction to some Chinese literature on new 
processes of marginalisation in China, see Rolleau-Berger (2009).  
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1 CEPAL structuralists on external disequilibria  
External disequilibria received the brunt of attention in early development 
economics because these were understood as potentially snubbing out nascent 
efforts at rapid industrial catch-up. Similar to other leading pioneers of the sub-
discipline, the early CEPAL economists principally focused on chronic foreign 
exchange gaps that arose due to the intensive import demands of late 
industrialisation and urbanisation, and subsequent tendencies towards domestic 
price inflation and balance of payments instability and crisis.5 Raul Prebisch 
argued that declining terms of trade in primary commodity exports further 
exacerbated these disequilibria, in tune with many of his contemporaries such 
as Ragnar Nurkse, Hans Singer, and Arthur Lewis.6 The dominance of 
Northern firms in various services, such as transportation, insurance, finance, 
and patent and royalty payments, was also commonly noted as an additional 
route by which Southern surpluses were siphoned. While Prebisch, like Lewis 
and others, initially posited in the late 1940s that aid or foreign direct 
investment (FDI) could have a positive and stabilising influence on these 
external disequilibria, later work by Furtado and Sunkel (as well as by Prebisch 
and Lewis)7 became increasingly critical of the rising dominance of 
transnational corporations (TNCs) in Latin American import-substituting 
industries (ISI). Together, this combined tradition of structuralist thought 
highlighted the trade and financial mechanisms that accentuated the already-
existing structural propensity of peripheral developing countries to experience 
chronic foreign exchange shortages in their attempts to industrialise.  
Of particular interest for the present analysis is the work of Celso 
Furtado and Osvaldo Sunkel, which was grounded on the centre-periphery 
approach of Prebisch (see UN/Prebisch, 1950). This approach aimed to 
elucidate the challenges posed by the historical integration of Latin America 
into the international economy. As outlined by Prebisch, the propagation of 
technical progress favoured technological development in centre and 
dependence on this technological development in peripheries. This pattern of 
propagation established the outward-directed, externally-propelled 
development of peripheries and the four characteristics of peripheral capitalist 
economies: declining terms of trade; marginalisation of disadvantaged 
populations in the peripheries; imitative metropolitan consumption patterns of 
periphery elites; and macroeconomic instability in the form of inflationary 
pressures and chronic foreign exchange gaps due to vulnerable economic 
structures.8 Prebisch promoted ISI as a way to break this mould, although he 
was cognisant of the fact that the intensive import requirements of ISI would 
exacerbate the tendency of foreign exchange gaps, thereby calling for the 
support of foreign finance.  
Furtado and Sunkel extended this CEPAL analysis to the patterns of 
ISI that were already emerging in Latin America as early as the mid-1950s, 
                                                 
5 See Fischer (2009b) for further discussion of these points.  
6 See Kaplinsky (2006) for a review of terms of trade issues with respect to China.  
7 See Lewis (1978: 38-46) for his discussion of the difference between foreign debt 
and FDI.  
8 See Polanyi-Levitt (2005) for a synthesis of the thinking of Prebisch.  
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including chronic balance of payments problems among the leading 
industrialisers in the region. They criticised the initial optimism of Prebisch, 
Lewis and other early development economists that FDI could lead or finance 
an autonomous process of ISI. Instead, they noted that it quickly led to the 
encroachment of US-based TNCs in key industrial sectors, particularly in 
Brazil and the Southern Cone. As such, Furtado and Sunkel were among the 
first theorists of the expansion of TNCs into the South and FDI-led strategies 
of industrialisation more generally, which at the time were novel approaches to 
funding late industrialisation. While steering clear of the more radical 
determinacy of the neo-Marxist tangents of ‘dependency theory’,9 both brought 
particular attention to the structures of ownership and the resultant control 
over flows of wealth that ensued from these increasingly transnationalised 
forms of industrial organisation.  
Furtado elaborated the understanding of technological dependence in 
the periphery. He noted that the way the peripheral Latin American countries 
accessed what he called ‘industrial civilisation’ was fundamentally different 
from even the late industrialisers that had preceded them. Earlier late comers 
such as Germany and, to a certain extent, Japan had largely developed their 
industrial technologies from within, on the basis of indigenous processes of 
innovation, whereas Latin American countries (as most post-war late comers) 
essentially accessed technology and industrialisation via imports. Domestic 
industrialisation therefore necessitated, by definition, import substitution in 
one form or another. Hence, Furtado (1973b: 20) argued that ‘…the ability of 
certain countries to control technical progress and to impose consumption 
patterns became the decisive factor in the structuring of the productive 
apparatus of other countries, which in consequence became ‘‘dependent’’’ 
(cited in Kay, 2005: 1204).   
This dependence tends to lead to dualism in domestic consumption 
and production structures. The upper strata of these structures are increasingly 
based on the absorption of technology and consumption patterns from the 
centres, and eventually finance and ownership as well, which reinforces 
external orientation and dependence. Lower strata remain grounded on more 
basic technologies and consumption patterns. Although the lower strata supply 
labour, technology adoption lowers the relative absorption of labour per unit 
of growth before surplus labour is exhausted. Furtado made this last point in 
contention with the optimism of Lewis (1954) that industrialisation in the 
peripheries would eventually lead to an exhaustion of unlimited supplies of 
labour and, as a result, rising wages among these lower strata. Rather, he 
contended that this structural dualism explains the polarising effects of 
peripheral and dependent growth within the Latin American context, arguing 
that dependence is reproduced through a combination of internal and external 
                                                 
9 It is questionable to what degree Furtado or Sunkel should be associated with the 
subsequent school of ‘dependency theory’. Kay (2005: 1205) traces one of the earliest 
uses of the term ‘dependency’ by a social scientist to Furtado (1956), while he was still 
working in CEPAL, although he also notes that Furtado was later criticised by 
Cardoso and other ‘dependency theorists’ for having an exaggerated confidence in the 
ability of the state to lead an endogenous process of development (ibid: 1204). I am 
also indebted to discussions with Kari Polanyi Levitt for insights on these matters. 
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social relations, economic structures and patterns of ownership. The synergy of 
internal processes of exploitation with external processes of dependence could, 
in certain periods, lead to substantial growth, but this growth would tend to 
lead to an intensification of internal processes of exploitation, in contrast to 
the experiences of Europe and North America.10  
Osvaldo Sunkel also elaborated the CEPAL structuralist analysis by 
examining the stratification of dependent economies in Latin America between 
transnationally-linked and excluded circuits of consumption and production. In 
the article that introduced him to the US academic mainstream, Sunkel (1972) 
argued that while it was originally thought ISI would free Latin American 
economies from their heavy reliance on primary exports, foreign capital and 
technology, the opposite situation resulted. After around 1955,  
…industry was taken over to a large extent by foreign 
subsidiaries, with the result that much of the benefit expected 
from industrialization has gone abroad in payment for capital 
equipment and in a transfer of profits, royalties and other 
financial payments... Although the massive penetration of 
foreign firms has accelerated growth rates, especially industrial, 
it has also accentuated the uneven nature of development (ibid: 
518). 
While he acknowledged that early pioneers such as Myrdal, Singer, Nurkse and 
even Prebisch emphasised the significance of foreign trade structure, he also 
noted that these earlier economists tended to see foreign financing and 
technical aid as having a positive and stabilising influence. The ‘new studies of 
“dependencia”’ led to an opposite recognition (ibid: 519).  
The role of foreign investment was particularly central. Sunkel argued 
that the ‘massive expansion and branch-plant nature of direct foreign 
investment has in fact some highly negative effects’ (ibid: 525). He highlighted 
four of these. First, the process of vertical integration between subsidiaries and 
headquarters results in flows of goods, finance and technology, as well as 
market-sharing agreements, which generally take place within firms even if they 
are against a country’s interests. Second, subsidiaries within one country tend 
to integrate horizontally, conglomerating among themselves and thereby 
influencing consumption and production patterns. They also influence the 
allocation of resources in the public sector, to the extent that they can acquire 
significant financial resources, private and public, with which to finance local 
expansion and foreign remittances, almost without the need of net additional 
foreign capital. Third, foreign subsidiaries exhibit a strong tendency to remit 
excess profits by manipulating the prices, kinds and quantities of their 
international transactions, which are mostly kept within the boundaries of the 
firm. Finally, a definite life cycle is associated with foreign subsidiary activities, 
with substantial initial contributions of capital, skilled personnel, technology 
and management, followed at later stages by cash outflows exceeding inflows 
and with little educational effect given the policy of retaining a monopoly of 
skills and technology within the firm (ibid: 525-27). Beyond these economic 
                                                 
10 Paraphrased from quote cited in Kay (2005: 1204); also see Furtado (1973a) for a 
corrective to his earlier stagnationist hypothesis regarding Brazil.  
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effects, he concluded that the socio-political consequences are of even far 
greater importance. (ibid: 527).  
Furtado and Sunkel provided important insights into how TNC-led 
FDI could undermine national processes of accumulation even in the midst of 
relatively rapid growth. In particular, they brought attention to ownership 
structure, in contrast to the earlier structuralists who focused on trade and 
production structure, thereby shedding light more clearly on various financial 
mechanisms of wealth transmission from peripheries to centres. These 
mechanisms could be identified on the income account (i.e. remitted profits of 
TNCs and interest payments on debt), or on the financial account (i.e. licit or 
illicit capital flight by domestic elites or else various mechanisms of capital 
repatriation by TNCs as private international capital flows were gradually 
liberalised during the 1960s). As noted by Sunkel, some of these mechanisms 
of financial transmission could also take place on the trade account through 
the emerging techniques of transfer pricing practiced by TNCs, as further 
demonstrated by Vaitsos (1973). Indeed, these emerging TNC practices added 
additional insight to the dilemma of declining terms of trade. Notably, these 
financial aspects of vulnerability accentuated the already-existing propensity of 
late industrialising countries to run chronic current account deficits due to their 
structures of trade and production.  
2   China’s accounts and balances since Opening and Reform 
There are several attributes of China’s external position that are worth 
comparing to these previous analyses of peripheral and dependent post-war 
industrialisation in Latin America. Several important distinctions also require 
qualification, notably the exceptional manufacturing export performance of 
China, which bears more resemblance to East Asia than anything Latin. 
However, a similarity with Latin America is the TNC dominance in China’s 
export industries, comparable to the TNC dominance in Latin American ISI 
sectors. Moreover, as noted by Naughton (1996), industrialisation in China is 
best understood as mixture between export-orientation and import 
substitution. It therefore bears more similarity to the industrialisation of large 
Latin American economies such as Brazil in the late 1960s than is normally 
accorded, albeit at a much larger scale and with more careful retention of 
national ownership in its ISI sectors, while segregating TNC participation to its 
export sectors.  
Indeed, this interplay between export and import substitution strategies 
is a key difference between China and both Latin America and East Asia. Both 
South Korea and Taiwan were able, for various reasons, to excel in 
manufacturing exports during their intensive catch-up phases without 
relinquishing control in their export industries to foreign ownership.11 In 
                                                 
11 See Amsden (1989) for a seminal analysis of this in the case of South Korea. Also, 
see Zhu (2010) for an interesting discussion of the difference between earlier 
industrialisers in the first phase of globalisation (i.e. the UK, the US, Germany and 
Japan), which mainly relied on debt as their main source of foreign financing, versus 
China in the recent phase, which has mostly relied on FDI, particularly post-1985. 
 12
contrast, the export sector in China today is dominated by ‘foreign-funded 
enterprises’ (FFEs). The FFE share of China’s exports rose from 13 percent in 
1990 to 41 percent in 1995, 48 percent in 2000, and 58 percent in 2005 (Li et 
al, 2007: 93). While ‘round tripping’ undoubtedly accounts for some of this 
increase,12 particularly in the 1990s, the bulk of the share represents genuinely 
foreign forms of ownership. In other words, the doorway for TNC entry into 
China has been, up to recently, predominantly through the export sector. This 
in turn contrasts with Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s, where TNC entry 
occurred largely through FDI in the ISI sectors as means to take advantage of 
protected domestic markets through foreign-owned subsidiaries. The Chinese 
model has resulted in exceptional export performance but also considerable 
foreign control over its means of earning foreign exchange. 
Terms of trade is another related point of comparison that has received 
some attention in the literature. It is already well established that China has 
been experiencing deteriorating terms of trade in its manufacturing exports, in 
some cases even within a single product category.13 According to Zheng and 
Zhao (2002), this deterioration was greater vis-à-vis developed countries than 
developing countries, it was less pronounced for labour-intensive 
manufactures, and it was worse in the medium to high technology intensive 
manufactures such as computers and office equipment, which were precisely 
the sectors in which China has increased its participation in international 
production networks most rapidly (before and after 2001). At the time, the 
authors concluded that this reflected the segmentation within such product 
categories between high-technology or high-value inputs produced outside 
China and the labour-intensive processing of these inputs in China, with the 
result that China’s involvement in international manufacturing networks 
effectively relies on leveraging its supply of cheap low-skilled labour even 
within these high technology exports. Similarly, Li et al (2007: 94) argue that 
the deterioration of China’s terms of trade since the 1990s has been the result 
of large FDI inflows into labour-intensive export sectors. They also suggest 
that TNC practices of transfer pricing for the purpose of tax avoidance as 
another possible cause, which bears strong similarity to the criticisms of TNC-
led industrialisation in Latin America by Sunkel (1972) and Vaitsos (1973), as 
discussed above. 
Arguably, the dazzling export performance of China would seem to 
compensate for these various weaknesses. In order to judge whether China has 
                                                 
12 Round-tripping is the term used to describe the evasion of capital controls by 
Chinese nationals, who then invest from Hong Kong to take advantage of preferential 
terms for FDI. World Bank (2002: 41) estimated that such round-tripping accounted 
for about one quarter of FDI flows to China in the 1990s, although care must be 
taken with this estimation because clear definitions and explanations of the estimation 
techniques were not provided and also because of the policy agendas implied. It was 
also probably less of a factor in the 2000s, in comparison to the 1990s when the 
capital account was much more closed, when there was more of a distinction in the 
treatment between FDI and domestic investment, and when traditional export sectors 
held a greater weight in total exports.    
13 E.g., see UNCTAD (2002: 119); UNCTAD (2007: 11-12); Zheng and Zhao (2002); 
and Li et al (2007). 
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truly escaped from the external vulnerabilities of peripheral late 
industrialisation, it is useful to analyse the balance of payments data more 
broadly, as presented below. Figure 1 presents China’s balance of payments in 
nominal current value terms from 1982 to 2008, with the sign of the reserves 
reversed in order to allow for easier analysis. Figure 2 normalises these nominal 
data as a proportion of China’s current value GDP converted at year-average 
market exchange rates.14 Episodes of major devaluation or revaluation of the 
exchange rate are also indicated. Figure 3 contextualises these data with general 
consumer price inflation rates and real per capita GDP growth rates.  
FIGURE 1 
 China Balance of Payments, current USD, 1982-2008 (reserves reversed) 
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Sources: CTEESY (2007: Table 3-1); CSY (2008: Table 3-32); CSY (2009: Table 3-32). 
 
 
Figure 1 presents the common view of China’s balance of payments. It 
is difficult to analyse these nominal data, besides the fact that China’s 
emergence on the global scene as a major surplus nation only became evident 
from 2002 onwards at the earliest. The increasing volatility on the capital 
account and in the errors and omissions is also striking. These patterns are 
much clearer in the next figure, which is presented together with Figure 3.  
 
                                                 
14 Market exchange rates are used instead of a PPP conversion because they reflect the 
weight of external balances in the local economy, relative to local resources. This 
obviously accentuates the appearance of shifts on the various accounts in periods of 
devaluation. 
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FIGURE 2 
 China Balance of Payments relative to China GDP, 1982-2008 
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Sources: same as Figure 1 and IMF International Financial Statistics database (accessed 22 July 2009). 
FIGURE 3 
 China price inflation and real per capita GDP growth rates, 1982-2008 
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Sources: CSY (2009: Tables 2-4 and 8-1) and equivalent in CSY (2000) for data in 1990s (note that RPI 
used instead of CPI from 1982-84 because CPI only starts in China from 1985 onwards). 
 
From the perspective of the normalised data, it is clear that the internal 
and external imbalances of China epitomised the classic structuralist prognosis 
of post-war peripheral industrialisation up until the mid-1990s, albeit with 
vigorous attempts to escape from this predicament. Periods of spurting 
industrial growth tended to lead to both inflation and current account deficits, 
which in turn were only resolved through austerity (relative to Chinese norms). 
For instance, after a few initial years of rapid growth and moderate price 
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inflation in the early 1980s, by 1985 the current account fell sharply into a 
deficit of -3.7 percent of GDP and China was losing reserves equivalent to -1.8 
percent of GDP. This imbalance was corrected through a combination of a 
sharp devaluation of the official exchange rate by over 40 percent in 1984 
together with further liberalisation of foreign investment in the Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs).15 The current account deficit nonetheless persisted 
throughout the 1980s, while price inflation peaked at almost 19 percent in 1988 
(amidst rapidly rising inequality). Both deficit and inflation were only corrected 
through the austerity that surrounded the events of Tiananmen in 1989, 
together with further large devaluations in 1989-90, after which the current 
account returned to a solid surplus in 1990-91. However, as soon as these 
brakes were released and strong growth resumed, particularly with the 
unleashing of SEZs across the whole country following the Southern Tour of 
Deng Xiaoping in spring 1992, the current account fell sharply back into deficit 
in 1993 (-1.9 percent of GDP), while inflation surged to a peak of 24 percent 
in 1994. China’s take off was turbulent indeed; throughout this entire period, 
rapid growth tended to induce current account deficits, while strong current 
account surpluses were only achieved through austerity or slowdown. 
Even in the lead up to China joining the WTO in 2001, it was not 
obvious that this predicament had been solved. The current account surplus 
was tenuous in 1994-96 despite another sharp devaluation of almost 50 percent 
in 1994 – the last and the one that also enacted the unification of the two-
tiered exchange rate system – along with a huge surge of net capital inflows 
elicited by the new SEZ policy, which reached 5.6 percent of GDP in 1994. 
Moreover, the peak in the current account surplus in 1997 at 3.8 percent of 
GDP was again partly related to the slow down induced by the East Asian 
crisis, which also threw China into an entirely new internal disequilibrium of 
general price deflation in 1998-99 and again in 2002. The current account 
surplus was also counterbalanced by the capital account, which briefly turned 
negative in 1998, and by the strong illicit or unrecorded net outflows 
represented by the errors and omissions, which were equivalent to -2.3 percent 
of GDP in 1997. Notably, reserve accumulation in 1998, at 0.6 percent of 
GDP, was equivalent to the net capital outflow and only one-third of the net 
outflows implied by the errors and omissions in that year. From 1998 to 2000, 
reserve accumulation remained at less than 1 percent of GDP, while the 
current account surplus declined to 1.3 percent of GDP by 2001. From a 
contemporaneous view, this was not a particularly secure position, particularly 
given the increasing volatility on all accounts and the uncertainty that followed 
the bursting of the dotcom bubble in the US.  
The reasons for government concern at the turn of the millennium are 
quite obvious in light of such fragile reserve accumulation and the persistent 
deficits in errors and omissions despite the relatively closed capital accounts, 
particularly considering the very fresh memory of chronic current account 
deficits earlier in the 1990s. Lessons from the financial meltdown in the ex-
Soviet Union undoubtedly heightened these concerns. This perspective also 
helps to explain the government’s resistance to revalue in 2004 and 2005, 
                                                 
15 See Yang (1997) for a seminal discussion of these policy dynamics.  
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especially in the face of the sudden surge in speculative capital inflows reflected 
by the errors and omissions, which turned positive for the first time and 
reached 1.4 percent of GDP in 2004. These added to a surge in licit capital 
inflows reaching 5.7 percent of GDP in 2004, much of which were also 
probably speculative. If these net flows had suddenly reversed, which was a 
possibility given early warning signs of an impending credit crunch in the US 
economy already at that time, together they could have easily overwhelmed the 
budding current account surplus, which reached 3.6 percent of GDP in 2004. 
Such suspicions were not far off given that the capital account subsequently 
fell below 0.5 percent of GDP in 2006 and 2008; in both years, net outflows 
implied by the errors and omissions exceeded these meagre net capital inflows. 
Moreover, minor deficits on various components of services and the 
income account have underlain the more general current account surpluses 
since 1995, parallel to the huge surge in net FDI inflows in the early 1990s (see 
Figure 4 below). Such deficits clearly differentiate China’s subordinate position 
from leading industrial powers, which generally earn surpluses on these 
accounts, as discussed in the first section. In particular, transportation, 
insurance, and patent and royalty payments remained continuously in deficit 
from 1995 up to the most recent data. The income account fell sharply into a 
deficit of -1.6 percent of GDP in 1995, reflective of the increasing role of 
profit repatriation that followed in the wake of previous FDI inflows. It 
remained in that range up to 2002 and only turned positive in 2005, probably 
due to the building backflows of interest income coming from China’s reserve 
holdings in the US, which counterbalanced the negative effects of profit 
repatriation apparent in the previous deficits. 
FIGURE 4 
 Selected services and income account relative to China GDP, 1990-2008 
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Sources: same as Figure 2. 
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The increasing volatility of capital flows is even more evident in the 
disaggregated financial account, shown in Figure 5 below. Other than FDI, the 
various components of the financial account and the errors and omissions 
followed a pro-cyclical pattern of boom and bust following the beginning of 
the East Asian crisis in 1997. For instance, the surge on the financial account 
in the early 1990s was entirely due to net FDI inflows. Since that time, net FDI 
was more or less a stable, slowly declining share of GDP at around 2-3 percent 
in the 2000s (Chinese net direct investment abroad only surpassed 1 percent of 
GDP for first time in 2008). In contrast, the volatility on the financial account 
from 1997 onward was due to ‘other’ investments and, increasingly, ‘securities 
and portfolio’, the latter registering a net outflow of -2.5 percent of GDP in 
2006. Net outflows on ‘other’ investments reached -4.2 percent of GDP in 
1998 (greater than the current account surplus in the same year), and again fell 
below -2 percent of GDP in 2007, reaching -2.5 percent in 2008. ‘Other’ 
investments include trade credits, loans, currency and deposits, and other 
assets, transferred by monetary authorities, general government, banks or other 
sectors. Given that the largest outflows on this account in 2007 and 2008 were 
with monetary authorities and banks, the plummeting of this account could 
represent a combination of large efforts by China’s monetary authorities to 
shore up the US economy alongside major divestment from China by foreign 
banks that were selling off their recent acquisitions in China as a means to 
bolster their balance sheets back home.  
FIGURE 5 
 China’s financial account, composition relative to GDP, 1990-2008 
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Also notable is the pro-cyclical upswing in 2004 in all of the financial 
accounts besides FDI. This was in large part related to speculation on the 
anticipation of currency appreciation at the time, which was facilitated by the 
 18
gradual liberalisation of the capital account and financial sector over this 
period. Much of the movement on the errors and omissions was also probably 
due to such speculative inflows and outflows surrounding the un-pegging of 
the renminbi in 2005, or else to currency speculation in the final phases of the 
international financial bubble in 2007 and subsequent deleveraging in 2008. 
Indeed, in light of the post-crisis return of what Nouriel Roubini has called the 
‘mother of all carry trades’ lashing East Asia in fall 2009 (RGE 2009), it is easy 
to imagine how such financial volatility will continue to increase and, in the 
event of a pro-cyclical swing downwards, could overwhelm both the shrinking 
share of net FDI inflows and even a moderately strong trade surplus. 
Naughton (2007: 421-22) argues that this increasing ability of financial flows to 
subvert capital controls is precisely one of the strongest reasons for capital 
account liberalisation given that a legal, regulated open capital account might 
function better than the status quo of increasingly evasive flows. However, the 
logic is akin to arguing that the door should be left open because the thieves 
are getting better at picking locks.  
Given the increasing volatility, the sudden surge in the trade surplus 
after 2001 has been crucial to the sustainability of this situation. Hence, it is 
important to question how the surge came about. It was not obvious even as 
late as 2001; the current account surplus (mostly trade in goods) only really 
took off above the previous heights achieved in 1990-91 (3 percent of GDP) 
and 1997 (3.8 percent of GDP), from 2005 onwards. As noted above, these 
earlier heights were achieved through slow-down. Hence, even as late as 2004 
it would not have been clear whether the improvement on the trade account 
was simply another short bout or a lasting occurrence. The sheer collapse of 
the capital account surplus in 2005 no doubt encouraged the government to 
prepare for the worst and to buttress the trade surplus in case bubble came to 
bust on the current account as well. In other words, the idea of Chinese 
exceptionalism, that the country was free from the external financing 
constraints faced by most other peripheral late industrialisers, derives from 
very myopic hindsight. The government of China was clearly well aware of 
this, even if the western financial press was not.  
The easy explanation for the surplus surge was China’s entry into the 
WTO, although this alone only offers a surface glimpse of the underlying 
processes at work. At a deeper level, the surge appears intimately related to the 
systemic rerouting of East Asian centred international production networks 
through China that followed the East Asian crisis in 1997-98. A detailed 
analysis of this restructuring is beyond the scope of the current paper, although 
some brief insights can be offered through regionally-disaggregated trade 
accounts, presented in Figures 6 and 7 below.  
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FIGURE 6 
 China Regional Trade Balances, 1997-2008 (current USD) 
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Sources: calculated from CSY (2009: Table 17-8) and equivalent tables in earlier yearbooks.16 
 
Figure 6 above shows how the pattern by which China has built very 
large trade surpluses with the North America (mostly the US) and Europe 
parallel to large trade deficits with East and Southeast Asia only emerged since 
the East Asia crisis.17 The rising bilateral trade surplus with the US receives 
most of the popular attention; this did accelerate after 2001 and increased 
more or less continuously up until 2008, as did the surplus with Europe. 
Indeed, the surplus with Europe grew even faster, starting from almost zero in 
2001 and actually surpassing the surplus with the US for the first time in 2009. 
However, these observations need to be qualified by the equally dramatic 
descent into deficit with the rest of Asia (mostly East and Southeast Asia), 
from a surplus equal to that with the US up to 1997, to a slight deficit in 2001, 
and then to a large deficit of -74 billion USD by 2004, almost equal to the 
surplus with the US of 81 billion in the same year. This descent stalled from 
2005 onwards, not because of a slow down in trade but because China’s 
exports to Asia started to catch-up with its imports from Asia. Nonetheless, 
about 29 percent of these exports to Asia in 2008 were to Hong Kong. Thus, 
they were also largely reflective of the broader production and trading 
networks occurring between Asia and Europe and North America, with Hong 
Kong serving a classic function as trading entrepôt.  
                                                 
16 Note that there is some inconsistency in the trade data from this source and the 
source used for Figure 1 above; this source reports marginally lower trade balances. 
However, the broad trends are similar.   
17 See Athukorala and Yamashita (2009) for a similar analysis, based on data from 
1990 and with more detail on disaggregated product data.  
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The picture is even more dramatic from the viewpoint of gross import 
and export volumes with Asia, shown in Figure 6 below. These exceeded the 
combination of trade volumes with the US and Europe. For instance, China’s 
imports from Asia increased from 147 billion USD in 2001 to 703 billion USD 
by 2008 (62 percent of total imports in 2008), while its exports to North 
America increased from 52 billion USD to 274 billion USD and its exports to 
Europe increased from 49 billion USD to 343 billion USD. In other words, 
growing trade imbalances have been built on an enormous increase in the scale 
of turn over in the regional economy, with trade volumes between China and 
the rest of Asia increasing by over 7 times in ten years. 
FIGURE 7 
 China Regional Trade Volumes, 1997-2008 (current USD) 
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More specific disaggregation of these trade flows and balances with 
Asia further reveals the emerging third or even fourth-tier position of China 
within the restructuring of production networks implied by these data (and also 
implied by the balances of various services, as discussed above). For instance, 
China’s trade surplus with Hong Kong was 178 billion USD in 2008. In 
contrast, its largest (and growing) trade deficits have been with Taiwan (at -77 
billion USD in 2008); South Korea (-38 billion USD); and Japan (-34 billion 
USD). Following these three first and second-tier industrial leaders, China also 
had significant deficits with what are considered third-tier countries within the 
regional industrial networks, namely, Malaysia (-11 billion USD), Thailand (-10 
billion USD), and Philippines (-10 billion USD). With the exception of obvious 
oil exporters, China otherwise ran relatively minor trade surpluses with most 
other Asian countries. Indeed, it would appear that China’s trade expansion 
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into other parts of Asia and the Global South is the twist side of its increasing 
integration and subordination within East Asian production networks.  
A growing body of literature on TNCs in Asia confirms this 
observation of China’s subordinate third or even fourth-tier position within 
these networks.18 Athukorala and Yamashita (2009) argue that the growing 
trade deficit between China and the US is structural, ‘related largely to the 
pivotal role played by China as the final assembly centre in global production 
networks’ (p.41). This role, they argue, has been ‘…based on its ample supply 
of labor, and moves taken by US firms to supply high-end parts and 
components from their Asian bases to China’ (ibid: 54-55). Hence, instead of 
China becoming an advanced-technology superpower based on its structural 
shift away from traditional labour-intensive products and towards ICT 
products, ‘closer examination of the data suggests… the rapid consolidation in 
China’s final-assembly stages of East Asian-centered global production 
networks of these products’ (ibid:48). Yao (2009) similarly argues in a stinging 
criticism of Rodrik (2006) that the export surge in the sector of machinery and 
electrical machinery and parts in China does not necessarily represent 
technological upgrading. ‘All indications suggest’, he concludes, ‘that the rise of 
the sector in China’s foreign trade be closely associated with its processing 
trade regime and foreign outsourcing to China, a reflection of the country’s 
trade development along the lines of its comparative advantage’ (ibid: 63).  
By referring to comparative advantage, Yao implies that China’s 
participation in such trade is largely based on the use of its abundant and cheap 
labour within these processing sectors. That China has been able to amass such 
large trade surpluses on the basis of this specialisation is thus more a matter of 
sheer scale and productivity (within low-wage assembly work) rather than of 
technological upgrading or moving up the value chain of these international 
production networks. Of course, China is achieving much technological 
upgrading and capturing much value added in its domestic state-owned 
sector.19 In this respect, a key aspect of China’s industrial policy has been to 
use its export sectors to overcome the financing constraints of an import-
substituting strategy of domestic industrialisation, similar to South Korea in the 
1960s and 1970s.  
However, in contrast to South Korea, the Achilles Heel of China’s 
strategy is the increasing TNC dominance of its export sector. For instance, as 
mentioned earlier, 58 percent of China’s exports (and imports) in 2005 were 
from foreign-funded enterprises. Thus, once the state purchases the foreign 
exchange surpluses generated by these enterprises, the resulting reserves 
effectively represent foreign claims on domestic financial assets. Similarly, the 
foreign exchange reserves collected through FDI also represent, by definition, 
foreign claims on domestic assets. Hence, Zheng and Yi (2007: 19) note that 
‘China’s growing foreign exchange reserves do not imply wealth that is 
                                                 
18 In particular, see excellent contributions by Athukorala (2007, 2009), Li et al (2007), 
Sung (2007), Athukorala and Yamashita (2009) and Yao (2009). Also see Bergsten et al 
(2006).  
19 See UNCTAD (2002: 77-83) for an interesting discussion on the differences of 
value added generated by exports from foreign-funded enterprises as compared to 
state-owned enterprises. 
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disposable at any time, but rather a sizeable indirect debt.’ They suggest that in 
2005, ‘only half of China’s accumulated foreign exchange reserves were 
consistent with its wealth, which allowed Beijing to fulfill international 
payment obligations. The remaining capital inflows (FDI and short-term 
foreign borrowings) could be interpreted as implied debts… that China would 
have to pay back eventually.’ Similarly, in communications with Jan Kregel, he 
indicated that from information presented to the recent meetings of the 
Commission of Experts of the President of the UN General Assembly on 
Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System, it was quite clear 
that the external figures on the foreign exchange holdings of China are 
meaningless for most purposes, especially since a large proportion are 
apparently non-repatriated profits of joint ventures with foreign 
multinationals.20  
Ownership is critical in this regard. It is useful to compare the situation 
of China with that of Germany, the other large surplus country in the global 
economy at the end of the first decade of the 2000s. Current account surpluses 
in Germany are by and large earned by the private corporate sector in 
Germany, generally based on German or trans-European forms of ownership. 
As a result, the net capital outflows that compensate the current account 
surplus mostly take place as private capital transfers. In this way, the public 
monetary authorities are not burdened by foreign reserve accumulation or 
sterilisation operations and current account surpluses become an instrument of 
German corporate expansion abroad. Similar processes of corporate expansion 
are also at work in the US given that it also sends net FDI abroad despite the 
general surplus on its financial account.21 Both countries are able to mediate 
their imbalances in this manner because the vehicles of surplus accumulation 
and/or direct investment abroad are largely national, i.e. firms with head 
offices that are located in the national economy.  
The opposite condition increasingly prevails in China. The bulk of its 
surpluses that are generated through foreign forms of ownership do not 
become a vehicle of expansion for the Chinese corporate sector except by way 
of the limited share of reserves that the government diverts to the activities of 
state-owned enterprises abroad or else to its sovereign wealth fund. In any 
case, and contrary to popular conception, the government is actually quite 
limited in terms of how it can use its reserves in this way given the need of the 
People’s Bank of China to match, as much as possible, the reserve assets on its 
balance sheet with the domestic liabilities that it used to purchase these 
reserves.22 Instead, the surpluses generated through foreign forms of 
ownership effectively serve as a vehicle for the expansion of foreign 
acquisitions in the domestic economy. Moreover, government efforts to 
sterilise the monetary effects of their currency purchases also effectively result 
in a subsidisation of these foreign claims on domestic financial assets. For 
instance, Zheng and Yi (2007: 21-22) note that China was paying out much 
                                                 
20 Email communication with Jan Kregel, 22 August 2009.  
21 See an excellent discussion of the US case in Kregel (2008). I am also grateful for 
the insights on these matters provided by communications with Geoff Tily.  
22 See Pettis (2010) for a superb discussion on this specific point, albeit he does not 
consider the dimension of ownership as discussed here. 
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higher rates of return on inward foreign investment and on its related 
sterilisation operations in China than it was earning from the resultant sterilised 
foreign currency, largely held in US Treasury securities. In other words, China 
has not only been financing the US government deficits; it has also been 
effectively subsidizing such financing, as well as FDI in China more generally. 
Of course, this could be taken as argument for capital account and financial 
liberalisation, although there are several reasons why such capitulation would 
be a bad idea for China. One important reason is that liberalisation would 
probably facilitate the increasing denationalisation of China’s means of 
generating foreign exchange, thereby worsening this underlying source of 
structural vulnerability. 
This situation is actually quite analogous to earlier structuralist critiques 
that ISI policies were effectively subsidising the expansion of TNC operations 
in Latin America, as discussed in the first section with reference to Sunkel 
(1972). Similarly, although FDI accounts for a very minor share of total 
investment and value added in China, it has been strategically concentrated in 
the export sector to such an extent that foreign-funded enterprises have come 
to dominate the main means of generating foreign exchange. This in turn has 
become the focal mechanism of transmitting foreign ownership into the 
domestic economy, rather than through FDI as would be conventionally 
conceived. It is in this sense that while surpluses and reserve accumulation by 
China do represent aspects of strength in the global economy (although 
relatively minor in comparison to the ability of the US and related offshore 
financial centres such as the UK to create liquidity), in a dialectical manner, 
they also represent a significant source of vulnerability, similar to the early 
successes of ISI in America albeit through quite different mechanisms. 
Revaluation or capital account and financial liberalisation would not solve 
these underlying structural issues. Instead, the adoption of full convertibility 
could potentially render China very susceptible to the types of speculative 
attacks that occurred in the East Asian crisis. 
3   Conclusion: between soft power and hard dependence 
This paper offered a reflection on the nature of Chinese integration and 
dependence in the global economy. It drew inspiration from the CEPAL 
structuralist critiques of Latin American industrialisation in the early post-war 
period, in particular focusing on the contributions of Celso Furtado and 
Osvaldo Sunkel. Their work shed important light on the central issue of 
ownership and how the emerging dominance of foreign ownership in key 
import substituting industries exacerbated the already-existing external 
vulnerabilities faced by Latin American countries in their attempts at industrial 
catch-up. This recollection is not to suggest that China is the same, but that 
important analogous lessons can be learnt. Through an analysis of China’s 
balance of payments from 1982 to 2008, the paper argued that simplistic 
evaluations of China’s strength on the basis of its external surpluses are 
exaggerated. Notably, the trade surplus and reserves of China only started to 
surge spectacularly after 2001. Before this time, China’s current and capital 
accounts were much more typical of a peripheral late industrialiser, in the sense 
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that growth spurts ended out exacerbating domestic price inflation and driving 
the current account into deficit. This tension was exacerbated by persistent 
deficits on the service and income accounts. Parallel to this, increasingly large 
and volatile movements on the capital account and in the category of errors 
and omissions underscore the importance accorded to defensive reserve 
accumulation by China. Notably, many of these aspects of external 
disequilibria were highlighted by the earlier CEPAL structuralists.   
Further inspection of the trade accounts also offers some clues on how 
China managed to transition in the early 2000s from classic peripheral late 
industrialiser to one of the largest surplus countries within the global trading 
system. Within the surplus surge on the trade account, China has built very 
large trade surpluses with the US and the EU parallel to large trade deficits 
with East and Southeast Asia, both patterns emerging only since the East 
Asian crisis in 1997-98. This reflects the massive rerouting of East Asian 
centred international production networks through China that followed the 
crisis, as well as China’s subordinate third or even fourth-tier position within 
these networks as point of final processing before exporting to North 
American and European consumers, as argued by a growing body of literature 
on transnational corporations (TNCs) in Asia. The regional trade balances also 
reflect the parallel processes of financialisation in the US and Europe that 
fuelled not only consumption in these final trade destinations but also 
Northern consolidation of control over these production networks. Northern 
consolidation is further reflected by the fact that China’s exports were 
increasingly derived from foreign-funded enterprises during the surge, resulting 
in an important transmission of foreign ownership into the domestic economy. 
It is vital to view the current debates regarding China in this light. The 
presumption that China is in a position of strength and should thus move from 
its defensive strategy of reserve accumulation to one that adopts a much more 
pro-active position of mediating imbalances in the international monetary and 
trading system through greater financial openness is one that treats China as if 
it were one of the central powers behind the expansion and regulation of this 
monetary and trading system. A false evaluation of such strength could have 
dramatic implications for China, particularly if the proposed strategies of 
currency and financial liberalisation would result in accentuating vulnerability 
to volatile capital flows in the near-future reverberations of the current crisis. 
This concern is all the more important given that, despite the attention focused 
on China’s reserves (much of them held in low yield and possibly depreciating 
US government assets), these have been in fact dwarfed by the volumes of 
international liquidity that contributed to the build up of the current crisis and 
that were largely generated by Northern financial systems. They are also 
dwarfed by the massive volumes of liquidity that were suddenly created by 
Northern central banks in response to the crisis, now estimated at well over 13 
trillion USD (i.e. more than 6 times the total estimated reserves of China at the 
time of these central bank interventions). China’s reserves are also dwarfed by 
the volumes currently involved in the enormous resurgence of (the still-
unregulated) carry trading that reverberated from such central bank 
interventions. In the wake of such huge surges of international liquidity and the 
possible inflationary consequences, it is plausible that China’s own foreign 
exchange reserves today could be quickly eroded in the medium term. From 
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this perspective, the concern of the Chinese leadership with regard to the 
current situation would seem to be based not so much on maintaining the 
value of the country’s saved assets stored in the US, as superficially suggested 
by many western commentators, but much more pertinently, on avoiding the 
predicament of boom and bust as experienced by Latin America and East Asia 
before it.  
In other words, there is a dialectical aspect to China’s rise. Its emerging 
clout in the global economy contains within it aspects of increasing 
vulnerability that are more peripheral and dependent rather than central and 
dominant in nature. This contrasts with the interdependent vulnerability 
associated with leading countries of the centre, which continue to retain the 
privilege of being the primary sources of expanding international liquidity and 
continue to display strong drawing power over this liquidity in times of crisis. 
This is important to acknowledge, particularly given that China is still a 
relatively poor country with enormous developmental challenges ahead of it. 
China’s leaders are probably quite rightly concerned with the predicament of 
falling back into the stringent external constraints typical of post-war 
peripheral late industrialisation, from which China only very recently escaped 
on the basis of riding a wave of financialisation and industrial restructuring 
emanating from the North and driven by Northern transnational corporations.  
Similarly, the wrong messages should not be sent to other developing 
countries through a false sense of strength of the so-called ‘Beijing Consensus’, 
as if the developmental lessons of previous late comers no longer apply or as if 
the Chinese experience of the last three decades could somehow be sustainably 
replicated. Moreover, China is only now entering a middle rung position within 
global industrial hierarchies, which is precisely where the leading countries of 
Latin America stalled and then fell after the 1970s. Hence, the strength of 
China must be qualified. Indeed, premature delusions of power might serve the 
leading global economic powers quite well, much as the ambitions of South 
Korea in the 1990s or of leading Latin American countries in the 1970s left 
them exposed to subsequent financial crises. While the channels of 
vulnerability might be different, the potential adversities are similar. 
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